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Why the analyst needs to change: Toward a theory of conflict, negotiation, and mutual influence in the therapeutic process

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As we thread our way through the patient's brambles, we trip over the big feet of our self interest, then stumble to those same feet to resume the quest for the other [McLaughlin, 1995].

This essay addresses a basic dimension of the therapeutic process, something that lies at the very core of it and is a central feature of all human relating: the experience and role of conflict—inner conflict (within both patient and analyst), and interactive (interpersonal) conflict. We cannot talk about conflict without addressing, simultaneously, what we believe is a realm of experience that is inextricably linked with it, namely, the ubiquity of deception and self-deception.

We are going to try to discuss conflict, deception, and self-deception in a fairly generic way, by which we mean a way that cuts across the specific languages of particular psychoanalytic traditions. Our views will be most familiar and compatible with readers who have moved away from the classical assumption that all conflict and defense derives from drive/defense structures—away from viewing transference and resistance as necessarily or primarily equated with individual,
intrapsychic distortions of reality. Yet, from this relational and intersubjective springboard, we propose some assumptions about the nature of conflict that differ from the customary focus of theorists working in the relational, intersubjective, and constructivist paradigms. Specifically, we develop a way of talking about conflict in the therapeutic relationship as deriving from the inherently *diverging interests* (identities and needs) of analyst and patient. We shall describe the deceptions and self-deceptions surrounding the conflicts of interest and the complex negotiation process that is often required to deal with it.

Conflict as an Essential Constituent of Relating

Consider Winnicott's (1950) incredible assertion, “The mother hates her infant from the word go” (p. 73). Winnicott was not talking about bad or less than adequate mothers. He was talking about all “good-enough,” devoted mothers. We don't think Winnicott was even talking simply about “hate” (the affect, or affective state) per se; certainly not primarily about the manifestation of a “destructive instinct” pressing for expression. We believe he was alluding to the affective dimension of something broader and more fundamental in the nature of human relating: the absolutely inescapable, major conflicts of interest that exist in the background between even the two individuals who share in the closest, most mutualistic relationship on earth—the relationship in which, without question, a natural empathy and love normally constitute the predominant affects bond.¹

¹The reader can basically interpret “conflict of interest” and “self-interest” in terms of the familiar, social meanings of these terms. Psychoanalytic readers may assume that self-interest as a motivational principle implies goals that are more conscious, calculated, and rational than those we observe in analytic work. We make no such assumption. The framework in which we understand self-interest as an overarching organizer of human motivation ultimately derives from contemporary evolutionary theory, in which the *overall dynamic system of human motivation*—not necessarily particular needs, wishes, or affects—is adaptively designed to operate, as much as possible, in a self-interested fashion (Slavin and Kriegman, 1992). The reader may also wish to see Trivers (1974) for a fascinating discussion of the biology of conflicts of interest (parent–offspring conflict) in human development and the wider world of nature and Slavin (1985) for a discussion of the function of repression in the context of parent–offspring conflict.
Consider what Winnicott says:

The baby is not [the mother’s] own (mental) conception. . . .
The baby is a danger to her body in pregnancy and at birth.
To a greater or lesser extent [she] feels that her own mother
demands a baby, so that her own baby is produced to placate
her mother.
He tries to hurt her, periodically bites her, all in love.
He is ruthless, treats her as scum, an unpaid servant, a slave.
He shows disillusionment about her.
. . . [After] having gotten what he wants he throws her away like
an orange peel.
He is suspicious, refuses her good food, and makes her doubt
herself, but eats well with his aunt.
. . . She must not be anxious when holding him . . .
If she fails him at the start, she knows he will pay her out forever
[p. 73].

The paper in which Winnicott wrote these lines, “Hate in the
Countertransference,” is, of course, not about mothers and infants
(although they are never far from Winnicott’s mind). Immediately
following the foregoing list of observations about mother and in-
fant, Winnicott states, “The analyst must find himself in a posi-
tion comparable to that of the mother of a newborn baby” (p. 74).
Winnicott then introduces his notion of an “objective countertrans-
ferece”—by which he means those aspects of the therapist’s feelings
about the patient that derive not from pathology in the therapist, nor
from pathology in the patient, nor even from the specific character
and style of the therapist as it interacts with the character and style of
the patient.

Rather, the so-called objective countertransference seems to refer
simply to a level of feelings, often fear and hate, that coexist with
love. The fear and hate that Winnicott finds central to human relating
seem to arise from what we see as the “psychic undertow” that operates
between any two distinct beings who are attempting to interact in an
intimate way. In an overarching, often unconscious way, each attempts
to use the other, to pull the other into his or her subjective world, and
to resist the pull, the undertow, in the opposite direction. Simul-
taneously, though, each needs to “use” the other to construct his or
her own identity and thus wants—must want—to take in aspects of
the other's subjectivity. Each tries to redefine the other in his or her own terms (and both to accept and to resist redefinition in the terms of the other). We call these universal relational tensions an undertow because they operate inexorably beneath whatever crashing of waves and ebbing and flowing of behaviors catch our attention on the surface.

Beginning with Winnicott’s mother, “who hates her infant from the word go,” we are also, as Havens (1997) puts it, confronted with the fact that “we stare forth from individually shaped and genetically different nervous systems onto a world seen from this time and place by no one else” (p. 526).

This innate individuality is not simply a function of having different histories (although it is, of course, immensely elaborated and developed by different sets of experiences). From the word go, as it were, our individuality derives, in part, from the fact that each of us must have access to inner signals that will prompt and guide us to construct and reconstruct our individual world in accord with our self-interest (including most prominently inner signals that guide the actual process of constructing a viable subjective sense of what constitutes our own self-interest in relation to the interests of others).

As Winnicott (1950) observed, “There is a core of the personality that never communicates with the world of perceived objects and that the individual knows . . . must never be communicated with or be influenced by external reality” (p. 187).

This “core” can be seen as not only referring to an inevitable effort to protect the vulnerable aspects of the self, but also as signifying an adaptive capacity to create and sustain the self in face of the average, expectable conflict, bias and deception that comes along with communication and influence in a relational world that, despite considerable mutuality, always includes significantly competing interests. There is a continuing tension, a web of conflicting and coinciding aims in the normal relational world that are sustained and amplified by our human capacity, as Havens (1993) notes, to use speech (not only to convey and communicate but also, regularly) for the purpose of concealing our thoughts, shaping them according to one or another prejudice. “Every human encounter is therefore a collision of viewpoints in which language both connects and conceals differences in outlook (Havens, 1997, p. 526).

Winnicott (1963) went on to say, “Although healthy persons communicate and enjoy communicating, the other fact is equally true
that each individual is an isolate, permanently non-communicating, permanently unknown, in fact unfound” (p. 187).

Again, we read Winnicott (and Havens) as attempting to capture a very basic human tendency to construct our communications unconsciously in complex ways that, despite genuinely shared aims, are nevertheless inevitably biased toward our own interests; we naturally anticipate that the communications we receive from others will be similarly biased.

Winnicott’s “core” is thus not a mute, defensively shut-off fortress but an adaptive aspect of how the self is configured, an aspect that serves as an innate, inner reminder that prompts us with something like the following message: monitor every communication, every relationship, that exerts a potential influence; despite significant overlap, my self-interest is unique and only partly shared by others; and even if they love me, they will often tend to act more in their own interests than in mine.

The core (as we see it) is not a “thing,” or set of contents that exists in a fixed, immutable way within us; it is a metaphor that captures the essence of a process by which we organize all interactive experience, selectively coding outgoing and decoding incoming communication. This process limits the vast shaping potential, the influence, that interactive (social) experience can have on the highly plastic human psyche. The core reflects our inner design for managing the paradoxical nature of the human adaptation to the relational world: namely, in order to create and maintain a sense of self—including a sense of our own self-interest—we must continually learn from and incorporate aspects of the relational world. We must be influenced and feel this influence to become ourselves. Yet the intrinsically ambiguous relational world will, in even the best of circumstances, be biased toward its own interests, will tend naturally to represent its constructions as “reality” and its aims and ties as more closely and altruistically aligned with our own aims and interests than can ever, in fact, be the case.

Winnicott’s observations about the “hate” that is present “from the word go” and the “core that must never be communicated with or be influenced by external reality” relate to fundamental aspects of our psychological being, vital constituents of relating. As we see it, Winnicott was not referring to an attunement to the realities of conflict that is reducible to “endogenous drives that need discharge” in the Freudian or Kleinian sense (although his Kleinian training certainly sensitized
him to the existence of inherent conflict "from the word go"). Nor was he referring to hateful and defensive responses to environmental failures as self-psychological or intersubjective perspectives stress (Kohut, 1972; Stolorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood, 1987). Nor was he simply referring to reactions to the inevitable vicissitudes and disappointments in relating as other relational perspectives would emphasize (Mitchell, 1988). We believe he was talking about a universal dialectic between all individuals and the relational world, a dialectic that a) is rooted in the existence of implicit conflicts of interest, b) is represented innately in basic affects like hate and the existence of a private core of the self, and c) is vitally linked to the complex innate strategies we employ to "use" the relational world in order to create and maintain our individuality.

Clinically, this dialectical conflict within and between individuals involved in intimate forms of relating will also operate "from the word go" (see Benjamin, 1988). In myriad forms and innumerable deceptive ways, our subjective worlds and our interests will conflict with those of our patients. The crucial dimension of conflict we are referring to is intertwined with yet does not derive from and is not fully graspable or understandable in terms of a) the patient's pathology, projected or displaced onto a blank screen neutral, or even affectively resonating therapist (as traditional analytic theorists and contemporary classical theorists might hold); b) the therapist's countertransference response to the patient's pathology, the experience evoked by a projective identification into the roles of others who were in conflictual relationships with the patient in the past (as many object relations and interpersonalist theorists might hold); or c) the failures of therapists to adequately empathize or sustain an attunement with the patient's subjective reality (as the self psychologists would have it).

What we are saying is that—like any two individuals (strangers, close relatives, intimate friends, lovers, parent and child)—therapist and patient operate through subjective worlds, needs, agendas, ultimately interests, that, to some extent, always diverge. At times their interests will inevitably clash. Woven into the most loving and cooperative motives (over and above the influence of professional roles) every individual organizes—really must organize—his or her subjective world to communicate and promote his or her own interests. From birth onward our subjectivities are naturally and inherently biased toward our own vital agendas. This bias is basically adaptive; it underlies the meaning of human individuality in a world of conflicting interests; and it may operate consciously or unconsciously.
The Adaptive Resistance to Influence in the Analytic Relationship

We develop here a perspective in which the centrality of the conflict between the patient's and analyst's needs and identities leads to continuing efforts to break down each other's identity: to reveal and examine each other's biases (identities, loyalties, agendas) and the inevitable conflicts between them. Patient and analyst continuously experience each other doing this. They experience and evaluate the integrity of each other's effort to engage in this process. The process is highly mutual and reciprocal (Ferenczi, 1932) although not symmetrical (see Aron, 1992; Hoffman, 1994; Beebe and Lachmann, 1988). Indeed, the substantially different roles of patient and analyst invariably heighten certain aspects of the inevitable conflicts between them and what they ultimately need to negotiate (Slavin, 1996a; Kriegman, 1998).

The analytic literature grapples with facets of this negotiation process using the technical frameworks of transference, countertransference, empathy, holding, affective resonance, role responsiveness, projective identification, enactment, resistance, and so on. But all these clinical conceptualizations lead to discussions of conflict in the therapeutic relationship in ways that, we believe, often obscure crucial aspects of how and why conflict is central to human relationships, how it operates inexorably within every thoroughly "good-enough" therapeutic encounter and is integrally tied to the therapeutic action.

Most of our clinical conceptualizations of conflict (over the whole spectrum from classical to object relational, interpersonal and self-psychological/intersubjective perspectives) exaggerate the difference between the therapeutic relationship and other intimate human interactions (Bromberg, 1991). Our concepts tend to restrict us to viewing conflict in the therapeutic relationship as arising from the patient's pathology, from the analyst's pathology (countertransference), from failures in technique, or simply from differing individual, subjective organizing principles (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992), interpersonal patterns (Aron, 1992), or the complexity of human relating (Mitchell, 1988).

We believe that all analytic traditions overemphasize the extent to which differences in the subjectivities of patient and analyst result from either instinctual clashes, relational failures, or the accidents of
an imperfect world. Rather, intersubjective disjunctions are often ultimately rooted in genuine conflicts of interest. In a variety of ways, it is conflicting interests that generate the continuing (self-interested) efforts at mutual influence that can be found within most therapeutic communications, and these conflicting interests are, inevitably, deceptively hidden within all versions of analytic technique. Consider the following kinds of clinical situations that, in one form or other, most of us have encountered.

**Nancy and the Analyst’s Newborn Child**

Nancy was a very troubled young woman who had been characterized by many other therapists as “very primitive.” She became agitated and depressed in response to hearing that her current therapist was about to have a child. Her therapist responded warmly to her, yet tried to articulate what he felt was idiosyncratic in her perspective on the situation. He conveyed something like the following thought: “We’ve seen how much you tend to feel that there is a limit to the amount of love and concern available in the world; so what I give to my child will reduce what is available for you.”

The implication was that the most significant dimension of Nancy’s current experience was a set of internalized assumptions carried over from a childhood during which she suffered enormous deprivation and frequently felt intensely envious, jealous, and rivalrous with her siblings. The emphasis on her past—although communicated in a compassionate way without any direct implication of “distortion”—implied that her views did not fit the reality of the current situation. Nancy seemed to contemplate the therapist’s words. But, following this session, she became more distraught and angry (in his view she regressed further) and became suicidal!

A careful continuing look at this case revealed that the therapist was deeply invested in his assumption that Nancy’s fear, rage, and regression came predominantly from her pathology, that is, that the threat to her emerged essentially from her characteristic way of organizing experience and was fundamentally at variance with his own basic sense of the world. He knew, too, that, to some degree, his experience of Nancy also arose from his analytic identity. He sensed that his analytic training and theory were biased toward his interests, geared to developing and protecting his therapeutic identity, his
healthy need as a professional to feel that he had adequate, valuable resources to give.

For example, in supervision on this case, he was reassured that, of course, he would have enough to give and that the crucial therapeutic question was why Nancy could not experience his caring. He was encouraged to look at how she had even managed to project her doubts and anxiety into him—managing to enlist him emotionally in the reenactment of her relationship with her rejecting parents—making him feel as though he were abandoning her. It was also pointed out that this was, simultaneously, a reversed side of the enactment: Nancy was now in the role of her abandoning parents (with whom she was identified) engaged in a rejection of the vulnerable child (projected into the therapist).

The analyst recognized that Nancy’s characteristic readiness to experience changes as threatening was clearly at play in the disruption that had occurred in the treatment. Yet the very power of Nancy’s “regression”—her intense transference—had set in motion an interactive process that led (with the help of further consultation) to a deeper reappraisal by the analyst of his own beliefs, specifically, of the way in which his views of Nancy shielded him from recognizing the elements of self-deception and self-protection in his own initial response to her. During this process, he also had the opportunity to experience the birth of his child—his own joyful preoccupation with it and the very real drain it created on his resources.

In subsequent meetings the analyst found himself needing to acknowledge the vital, inherent truth that Nancy’s “transferential anxiety” had ultimately brought him to hear: that, of course, his life energies were and would be significantly absorbed by a child of his own flesh and that his relationship with his child did represent a different—in many ways, far more powerful—investment than his bond with her. He acknowledged and discussed the reality of these conflicts, including his own struggle to recognize and articulate them. Nancy seemed to experience something in these discussions as genuine. She began, as she put it, to feel “real” again; she no longer felt that her therapist had “disappeared.” She became less afraid and—in her inimitable way—quipped that “maybe her analyst would actually learn something about nurturing that might be of use to her.” As she recompensated, they went on to explore many of the additional, painful, and highly defended personal meanings that his becoming a father held for her.
Consider another familiar therapeutic conflict. Tanya was experiencing recurrent, extreme distress at "having to pay to be cared about" by her analyst. Very careful attempts to use the analyst's empathic understanding to clarify the personal meanings of Tanya's distress in terms of either her ongoing experience in the analysis—or prior painful disappointments in her life—were met with doubt, sometimes by withdrawal, sometimes with an understanding that ultimately seemed compliant. The analyst thought he had already reached a workable resolution regarding the complex meanings of money through his own personal treatment, supervision, and extensive clinical experience. He also seemed to be closely attuned to the painful way in which paying for therapy replicated Tanya's individual history of being taken from and used by others, of never having experienced a generous and genuine giving.

Yet, Tanya's persistent "transferential anxiety" over the meanings of the fee eventually evoked a broader range of thoughts and self-confrontations in her analyst. Tanya's persistent distress eventually compelled him to confront his sense that the disappointment, shame, and rage associated with paying for treatment could be analyzed in a way that would essentially transcend the painful sense of their differing investment in the therapeutic relationship, that understanding the individual subjective meanings of paying could somehow allow them to override the way in which these real differences in participation signaled the existence of their painfully conflicting interests. The analyst ultimately conveyed to her that he could see that money was an indication of one of the ways in which their interests did, in fact, diverge. In charging her, he acknowledged, he could see that he was clearly pursuing his own interests—which, in this respect, were quite different from and actually in conflict with hers.

The analyst's earlier attempts to explore the issue of money with Tanya were cast in what he believed were the meanings that historically had shaped her subjective world. That her analyst did not initially grasp the inherently conflicting interests that pervaded their relationship lent weight to the implication that her reactions to the rules of exchange in the analytic situation were rooted in her idiosyncratic unconscious organizing principles. As carryovers from her past, this old set of meanings undoubtedly needed to be explored empathically in the present therapeutic relationship.
Yet Tanya needed more than to have the analyst empathically acknowledge and help her articulate her painful distress about "paying to be cared for" and her suspiciousness about the genuine character of the caring thus received. She seemed to need him to recognize that her feelings were, in part, responses to certain real implications of paying him for maintaining their current relationship. That is, she needed to have a firmer sense that her analyst was going to be able to acknowledge the existence and potential implications of the existential dilemmas created by inherent conflicts of interest. She seemed to benefit not only from a sense that her analyst could become aware of how these existential dilemmas were woven into their relationship, but from a sense that he could grasp how her sensitivity to this conflict represented an essential adaptive capacity on her part.

We believe that Tanya essentially used this aspect of her transference (her capacity to mobilize and express her anxiety and suspiciousness) to probe the therapist's capacity to become more aware of the inevitable "background of conflict" that formed the context for their mutual work together. She seemed to need to see if he could face the ways in which his interests were clearly different from hers and, in fact, were naturally biased toward himself. She initiated (and he engaged in) what we would call a transferential dialogue about it, a dialogue in which she compelled some real change in his views (see Slavin and Kriegman, 1992; J. Slavin, 1994).

The cases of Nancy and Tanya illustrate two of the most common clinical arenas in which the analyst's interests clearly diverge from those of the patient: the existence of the analyst's real kinship ties and the exchange of money for the analyst's attention. As a function of the real, conflicting interests that pervade these arenas, interactions within them are fraught with significant deception and self-deception. The relational conflict and deception seen in the cases of Nancy and Tanya go well beyond the idiosyncratic aspects of these particular analysts' and patients' subjectivities. Beyond the recognition that we inevitably "trip over the big feet of our self interest" (McLaughlin, 1995, p. 435) and ultimately encounter the "hate" in our countertransference (Winnicott, 1950), we need to understand (in much broader, more basic terms) why these dimensions of the treatment relationship universally arise.

These cases illustrate the operation of a deep, natural, human sensitivity to the ways in which our needs and identities conflict with
those of others. This universal awareness forms a context in which a range of other personal, historical, and intersubjective meanings take shape. While the existence of these conflicting interests is a painful reality that must slowly be grasped and lived with over the course of treatment, the process of arriving at a relatively less deceptive and self-deceptive discourse about such conflicting interests is fundamental to the viability of the analytic relationship. Beyond the obvious and direct acknowledgment of the conflicts experienced during mini-“crunches” (Russell, 1973) like those with Nancy and Tanya—in virtually all long-term, intensive therapeutic work, there is a subtle process by which analyst and patient struggle with seeing and acknowledging the real conflicts in their needs and identities. This process is central to the therapeutic action.

How the Analytic Situation Heightens the Experience of Conflict and Deception

Analytically oriented treatment is designed to be a process by which an unrelated person (someone without the depth of commitment of a family member or a close friend) is given extraordinarily privileged access (and power potentially to influence) very deep layers of the mind. Given the view of the relational world we have been presenting, an inherent, “adaptive skepticism” is likely to exist between any two individuals—including a patient and an analyst—concerning a new situation where an unrelated person invites the establishment of an intense transference and potential renegotiation of identity. As we see it, a patient’s skepticism is a crucial adaptive capacity. It balances the equally vital capacity for a “willing suspension of disbelief.” It serves as a means of evaluating the particular texture of the overlap and divergence of the interests (the identities) of patient and therapist. That is, the patient must assess the likelihood that the potential activation of archaic longings and other repressed or disavowed aspects of themselves will be occurring in the context of a truly safe and promising relationship. Patients are likely to call into question only what they experience as their essential, ongoing sense of self (and self-interest)—likely to allow themselves to “use” (be influenced by) their analyst only when they experience the analyst as genuinely allied with their interests (see Weiss and Sampson, 1986).

Yet, as Nancy’s and Tanya’s analysts repeatedly discovered, there exist a range of ways in which the interests of patient and analyst
regularly clash. The inherent tendency of both to construct their experiences and communicate in a biased fashion means that the patient's sense that the analyst is fundamentally allied with the patient's interests can be achieved only in an elusive, intermittent way. We think a crucial aspect of the therapeutic action lies in an ongoing, two-way negotiation process by which patients come to experience—then inevitably doubt, lose, search for, and repeatedly re-create with the analyst—the vital sense that the analyst is willing and able to become sufficiently allied with their interests.

Quite apart from individual, pathological mistrust carried into the analytic relationship by the patient, the fact is that, in all naturally occurring human relationships, the "power to influence" that we grant to persons outside our closest family relationships normally depends on our tangibly experiencing real, long-term, stable reciprocity in our interactions with them. We may significantly change in the context of marriage, intimate, enduring friendships, and, occasionally, some mentor, collegial, and business relationships. Yet, in each of these relationships, the other partner makes major tangible investments or takes close to equally large risks. In virtually every sphere of our lives, we humans basically operate through such experienced, carefully monitored and evaluated reciprocity (Trivers, 1971).

Yet the analyst is an unrelated individual who asks the patient to pay (sometimes dearly) for what is always experienced (at times by even the most grateful patients) as a relatively small investment in terms of visible costs to the analyst. With an analyst there is little tangible, reciprocal sharing or exchange and—for long periods of time—usually ambiguous and subtle results.

In this light, consider the implicit message we deliver to our patients:

Though I, as analyst, give you little that is tangible in return—and, in fact, insist that you pay me—I expect you to trust me, open yourself up to my influence, and give free reign to powerful fantasies and wishes. I imply that the interpersonal negotiating power, as it were, that the activation of these forces within you confers upon me will ultimately lead us to reorganize you in ways that are more aligned with your real interests than you can at this point even imagine (and that, right now, either of us can actually know).  

2Also see Kindler's (1995) references to the therapist's "entitlement to intimacy" and Friedman's (1991) notion of the intrinsic "seductiveness" of the analytic situation.
The Therapeutic Transference as a "Mimicry" of the Parent-Child Relationship

Consider also some of the larger meanings of the analyst's interest in evoking an intense transference attachment and potential regression. We expect a therapeutic transference to develop: we create a setting and a way of relating designed to revive aspects of early experiences in the context of which the patient constructed basic conclusions about who he or she is and what can be expected from interactions with others. The analytic relationship is essentially designed to mimic, as it were, the unique emotional power and influence that early familial ties naturally hold for the child in the human life cycle. Through this mimicry, the transference creates a highly emotional human situation in which it may be possible to revise some of one's fundamental conclusions about oneself and the world.

Because we live and breathe the life-cyclical realities of our species every instant of our lives, we should not take for granted (absurd as it may seem to question it) the fact that children "allow" their parents and the familial environment to develop the degree of influence, the power as internalized presences (introjects) that they normally exercise in constructing the child's self organization, that is, in molding the child's basic definition of self and self-interest. Yet, despite the mother's "hatred for her infant from the word go"—the very real conflicting interests and psychic undertow that operate between parent and child—the fact is that in a natural environment parents can be expected intrinsically to share their child's interests very deeply and to invest in them (more than anyone else) over a long period of time (Trivers, 1974). This seems to mean that the child's "core personality" (in Winnicott's [1963] sense) is, in fact, predisposed to allow more communication and influence (to modulate its innate skepticism to a greater degree) in early interactions with related individuals than at any other time in the life cycle. The therapeutic transference relationship essentially mimics these formative, developmental relationships in which there is a far different form of investment than in the analytic situation. It is thus inconceivable that our patients would not have an underlying sense that the experience of heightened transference expectations and longings exposes them to a dangerous deception and invites them to engage in a perilous self deception.

However we conceive of the meaning and function of the transference, patients are apt to feel within it the potential for a tangible, reciprocal investment in their self-interest that is seductively
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similar to what natural, formative relationships could entail. And, yet—despite much in the analytic relationship that is as heartfelt and genuine as in any relationship—this therapeutic version is not the same as what occurs in most other reciprocal relationships that give rise to such powerful emotions. The pain of paying for concern, the constant reminder at the end of each hour of the limits of the therapist’s involvement, all signal a much broader and more basic reality of the analytic situation: the therapeutic relationship does not carry with it the inherent investment in the patient’s interests that kin and other natural, reciprocal relationships regularly entail. Patient and therapist must negotiate ways by which the patient may come to experience that, despite its painful “unrealness,” the treatment relationship is, in fact, real enough to justify the patient’s fully engaging himself or herself with its potential power and influence (Slavin, 1996b).

Just what is the analyst’s investment in the patient? How far reaching is it in comparison with the natural context of familial hate and love in which the child’s “core personality” may be designed to allow relatively greater communication and influence? Analysts tend not to define their core self-interests in a fashion that includes the self (and self-interest) of a specific patient to a great degree. Indeed, many of the rules of therapy are structured precisely to ensure that, the analyst’s self-definition does not include the patient’s self-interest to an overly great degree. Consider the relative experience of a therapist and patient if, for some unavoidable reason, the relationship is prematurely lost. Given the risks the patient is asked to assume and given the analyst’s relative safety and comfort, it is hard to imagine any human situation more likely to elicit a vigilant readiness to detect signs of potential conflict and deception. Beyond this imbalance in risk and safety, the analyst often tends to equate his or her subjectivity with reality; what is tilted toward the analyst’s interests is often subtly conveyed as really in the patient’s benefit.

The Patient’s “Innate Skepticism”

Like Tanya and Nancy, all patients tend ultimately to compel us to face the fact that there is something fundamental in the relational structure of the analytic relationship, which, in a real sense, should make the patient suspicious. In the thick of the struggle with the unique transference–countertransference complexities of our relationship with a particular patient, we tend to ignore the fact that the therapeutic
negotiation process probably carries the natural human capacity for
self-revision (in the context of a powerful relationship) to an unusual—
perhaps, in some ways, unnatural—extreme. This is why something
tantamount to an “innate skepticism” is activated in most patients
concerning this almost unparalleled new situation in which an
unrelated person deliberately offers him- or herself as a vehicle for
profoundly influencing and altering a patient’s identity. This adaptive
skepticism is, for us, a kind of backdrop to all discussions of
“resistance.” It refers to a general, adaptive core in all forms of
resistance. This core is distinct from (although perhaps intertwined
with) the “dread to repeat” (Ornstein, 1974) particular, painful
relational scenarios that have thwarted development in the past.

As we see it, a patient’s innate skepticism is the adaptive phenom-
enon that Winnicott was trying to describe when he struggled to
articulate what he experienced as a “core that must never be in-
fluenced.” It signifies a fundamental, universal form of “resistance to
influence”—one that by no means aims to bar all influence, but, rather,
subjects all potential influence to the scrutiny of a basic relational
test: what is the texture, the subjective feel, of the overlap and
divergence of this other person’s interests and my own? Is this
relationship actually sufficiently geared to my interests to (re)awaken
my deepest longings? Is there enough of a sense that the analyst is
willing and able to gear this relationship to the enhancement of my
genuine interests—and consistently maintain that biased focus in my
favor—for me to open up those aspects of my inner experience and
desire that I long ago concluded were not safe to expose to relational
influence? In a way that both analyst and patient dimly sense, because
the analyst is an Other, whatever the analyst can offer will come
wrapped in who he or she is—his or her needs, identity, biases. And,
therefore, the patient is going to have to lose parts of him- or herself,
compromise his or her interests, be hurt in the inevitable adaptation
to the analyst.

Transference as an Adaptive Probe

The human capacity to develop and interactively use transferences
may actually be geared, in significant part, to expressing and probing
the potential for recognizing and negotiating the ambiguous mixture
of real conflict and mutuality in human relatedness. Tanya repeatedly
used her sense of the unreality of the "paid-for caring" in the treatment relationship to find out whether her analyst could see and accept his own needs as distinct from—even, at times, inimical to—hers. The analyst's recognition of his need to use her for his own ends did not diminish her longing to be cared for without reciprocating financially—indeed to be given more unconditional love than probably even a very good parent would provide. Yet the greater clarity about their conflicting interests significantly diminished the deceptive and self-deceptive blurring of their interests—the "insult added to injury"—that made the "unrealness" of the analytic relationship, with its painfully real limits on the expression of love and investment, even more painful and dangerous than it needed to be.

Nancy also responded intensely to her sense of this potential deceptiveness in the transference. She was not part of the analyst's life in a way that permitted her to observe or directly influence his investment in her even to the extent that a child can affect the relative investment in a sibling. She thus needed to mobilize fantasy and emotion within her transference as a way of probing the analyst's capacity for candid reflection on their conflicting interests over the investment in his own child.

Tanya reacted to one of the most thorny areas of conflicting interest and potential deception in the analytic situation: that, in the early part of the analytic work, there may be, for some patients, a strong sense of the situation as tilted toward the fulfillment of the analyst's needs—financial, certainly, and also in terms of professional identity. If treatment is successful, the balance in the exchange is restored in the (very) long run. But, meanwhile, the painful experience of adapting to a relationship that is, indeed, structured in the short run to benefit the other person is one major way in which the "asymmetry" of the treatment relationship becomes experienced as problematic. Real diverging interests and the accompanying potential for deception and self-deception are amplified by the analytic context.

In many respects therapists must sustain an exquisite alertness to self-deception and avoidance of deception. For not only is the analytic relationship basically prone to the same complex web of conflict and deception as are other human ties, but the analytic relationship must ultimately justify its potential influence without making the same kind of real investment in the patient's life that is often found in other, naturally occurring reciprocal bonds. The negotiation between analyst and patient must continuously transform the deceptive part of the relationship, the unreality, into its benign form, something that is
experienced as play and creative illusion (Winnicott, 1969). Ultimately, it must be real-enough on its own terms and in its own way (Greenberg, 1986) to justify the patient's using it effectively to question and revise fundamental conclusions about, and ways of interacting with, the relational world.

As Tanya, Nancy, and the case we are about to present compelled their analysts to recognize, one of the major ways in which therapists fail their patients revolves around the therapist's use of self-deceptive strategies for protecting or enhancing his or her interests in a fashion that is cast in terms of the interests of the patient. In our view, the danger that many patients sense in such a "confusion of interests" is not simply the dread of a repeated traumatic experience of major boundary confusions in their past. Within many ordinary enough, everyday deceptions lies the potential for further loss and erosion of the vital capacity to define, know, and promote one's own interests. We believe that this tendency to engender a confusion of interests is the central feature of many less than good-enough, traumatizing, pathogenic family environments. And it is not uncommonly replicated in many therapies woven into what therapists codify as "technique."

By focusing on relatively isolated moments during a long, complex treatment process, the brief vignettes of Nancy and Tanya may suggest that we believe there can exist a clarity and simplicity in such analytic negotiations. There are, of course, many dimensions to the process of mutual adaptation that signal to patient and analyst alike that a genuine negotiation is taking place. In the following case example, we hope to convey a bit more of the enormous complexity in this process of negotiation and mutual adaptation.

**Edward and His Analyst**

Edward was the most intensely and tenaciously depressed person his analyst had ever known. Trials of virtually every known medication

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3This "confusion of interests" can be very destructive to the child, and we would probably tend to call its effect "traumatic." However, it can operate in subtle ways over a long period of time and can lead to a very familiar event: our dealing with very troubled and confused patients who continually exclaim, "What's my problem? I had a good family/childhood. Nothing really bad happened to me."
had been almost totally ineffective. After a few years of treatment, on occasion the analyst felt that there were small, momentary brightenings in Edward’s mood, brief periods of improved concentration, and, from time to time, moments of interest, intense passion, and insight. To his analyst, Edward seemed in these moments to be noticeably more alive.

The positive moments, the flickerings of hope and passion, were linked to the analyst’s highly consistent efforts to remain closely attuned to Edward’s subjective world, to remind herself that, more than anything else, he needed to establish (and continually restore) the sense that someone could grasp his experience of deadness and impossibility in which he constantly lived. They had come to construct a picture of his having grown up as an unwanted child—a child of a removed, depressed mother and a distant, critical father—who felt that he existed only insofar as he corresponded to and validated everyone else’s expectations for him. He was tortured by an unresolvable dilemma: although he craved intimacy, attempts at closely relating with other people invariably left him feeling lost, trapped in what he called “the black hole.” There he was bereft of meaning, lived only for the other person, and virtually lost all sense of himself as a real, living being.

Although in some ways the treatment relationship had become a kind of sustaining bond through which he seemed to feel more understood than he had ever felt in any other relationship, Edward’s intense, deadening hopelessness always returned. He felt that he could never have the sense of aliveness that other people felt. Nor could he tolerate the deceptiveness, the hypocrisy, the self-deceiving “mechanical social ritual” that he astutely observed in the lives of others. Yet the more he removed himself from “meaningless social contacts,” the lonelier he became.

Over time, Edward’s analyst became regularly aware of living with a powerful, anticipatory dread within herself, a dread of what felt to her like the repeated undercutting and undermining of all good feelings. Early on in one session, Edward seemed to be fighting off the horrible tug of another slide into hopelessness. For an instant, the analyst was aware of silently siding with what she sensed as Edward’s effort not to lapse, once again, into a state of angry despair. She attempted to remain closely attuned to the story he was telling about a perennially frustrating problem at work. As the hour proceeded, however, it became clear, that Edward’s despair was gaining the upper hand. Nothing was helping. Whatever they might come to understand, he still had no life.
"Can't you see," he said, "I am dying more each day. This is futile."

In the midst of this hopelessness, it seemed as if something inside her began to talk. She heard herself saying, "At times like this, I sometimes feel that all I can do is to be here with you in your despair." And then, as she realized it, she added, "Yes, there is something more, maybe more important. I, I have to try to deal with the part of me that really doesn't want to feel it."

In the next session, Edward said that something "sort of strange" had happened: "That image of you had a different sense to it. Different from the ways I think about us... you as a person who's enduring the despair... it puts you inside the image rather than outside it. Do you know what I mean?"

"I think so."

"As opposed to me being desperate, and you trying to know what to do about it. And me convinced that you can't do anything about it—enduring the desperation together. I think it's probably the only real comfort you can give me."

In many moments like that, it became clear to the analyst that her arduous and careful effort to remain attuned to Edward's subjective world clashed painfully with her own sense of life and hope. At a very profound level, her sense of hope for Edward was rooted in her own need to maintain a basically positive view of herself and of life, as well as her need to feel hopeful about the analysis itself. To the extent that Edward seemed to sense this conflict between them—and particularly that he sensed any tendency in her to deceive herself about whom the hope was really for—his despair and rage intensified.

Note that "whom the hope was for" was often quite ambiguous, even paradoxical. Edward's analyst felt a need to be hopeful about the analysis in a way that she felt compelled to acknowledge was for her, after all, analysis was part of her identity. Yet she also felt an ethical demand that she not fall prey to some projective identification (or pull toward an enactment) and allow Edward's despair and hopelessness to fill her: wouldn't she be failing her patient if she lost hope? The powerful, emotionally charged, paradoxical ambiguity threatened her identity in a destabilizing manner that added significantly to her simpler defense against despair and hopelessness about aspects of human existence. Thus, the conflict between Edward's need to have her "decenter" and experience the legitimacy of his subjectivity (his despair) and her need to find ways to stand outside the hopelessness was quite complex.
When she allowed his experience to move her to confront these aspects of the real conflicts between their identities (and her own need to keep the conflict out of her awareness) she could “hear herself” saying something to him that had a very different feel to her than her usual, careful, consistent empathic inquiry had. In a way that pathologized neither him nor herself, she communicated her own struggle to join him. Her response was spontaneous and authentic because it reflected her direct struggle with the conflict between them; and she conveyed something crucial about her ongoing capacity and willingness to be moved, changed, by him, despite countervailing pressures within herself.

She essentially demonstrated her willingness to experience her own internal struggle over hope and despair, an inner conflict that was induced, in part, by the conflict between them. She needed to reopen her own efforts to come to terms with some of the grief and despair she had felt in her own life. Having a genuine relationship with Edward required her to reimmerse herself in painful realities for which she had successfully and adaptively found a working resolution. It seemed as though she conveyed something crucial about her ongoing capacity and willingness to be moved away from something that had been provisionally settled in her own identity.

**Deepening Conflicts with the Analyst’s Identity**

Despite these moments in which they negotiated a greater psychological “realness” in their relationship, Edward felt that the closer they became, the more he was condemned to live with a bitter, frustrated longing to be a real part of his analyst’s life, her real life, like the “real” people in her life, her family and friends. Most painful was that while they could recognize and talk about his need to be held, she could never really hold him.

His earliest memory was of being in his mother’s arms but sensing that she was vague and distracted. Mother didn’t put him down, yet it felt as though she didn’t really want to hold him. The analyst’s closeness now only makes him more painfully convinced that, as in every relationship he has ever had, he is being tortured by getting something but not getting what he really needs. He clings to her while she pursues her real life; he stands on the sidelines.
If she actually (physically) held him, he believes it would destroy her life. So the only way he can feel held by her is if she admits and accepts his hopelessness, their hopelessness together—that is, the hopelessness of analysis and of life itself. They must accept that they have to stop engaging in a futile process. What can analytic understanding accomplish? He has no life. Can’t she see, he is dying more each day? He wants to die. He realizes (when she points it out) that this Catch 22 is the essential dilemma he experiences at every turn, the “black hole” of relationships: he desperately needs to feel that she is genuinely with him, yet he can feel her to be genuinely with him only if she accepts his reality, his belief that analysis is futile. And if she does, their relationship must end.

She knows that in some way it is a Catch 22: a paradox that ultimately derives from the fact that their needs are in conflict. And his need for her to feel his despair profoundly conflicts with his desperate need for her to sustain her—and his—hope. She must recognize his inner conflict. But she has come to realize that, first and foremost, she must wrestle with the real conflict between them, not gloss over the ways in which analysis is, in a real sense, a seduction, a tease, bringing him to experience his needs intensely yet not providing the real loving holding that he ultimately needs.

Over the years, the analyst became increasingly aware that their relationship entailed enormous risks, risks for which, when it came down to it, she was not prepared by her training or her own long and productive analysis. Sometimes the risks and dangers were felt as largely external: when Edward seemed more desperate and suicidal, she feared being accused of driving him crazy by doing analytic treatment with a man who could not tolerate it. Frightening images of Margaret Bean-Bayog (and the personal and professional catastrophe that had befallen her in her “regression” treatment of Paul Lozano) drifted through her mind. She knew that some of her valued colleagues and teachers might well fault her for pursuing an intensive analytic treatment with a man so disturbed. The conflict felt like disloyalty (her abandonment of them and their teaching) as well as like a direct danger to her interests (her professional reputation and livelihood). Not only might she fail to help him, she might hurt him. She might also deeply hurt herself in the process.

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4The widely publicized Boston case of a psychiatrist whose career was destroyed over her work with a severely disturbed man who eventually killed himself.
With countless reiterations of this theme, the analyst came to a wrenching, emotionally complex appreciation of what Edward was compelling her to see. On numerous occasions, she began to try to communicate her grasp of this to him. Indeed, in many ways, she would not (analysis, as she practiced it, could not) give him what he needed: to be held, to be a “real” part of her life. Nor could she fully accept the legitimacy of his despair and fully decenter into a complete empathic union with his hopelessness; as long as she was functioning as his analyst, she could never fully accept that psychoanalysis with him was futile. Yes, these were, in significant ways, limitations of her method, not simply his inability to adapt to the limitations, or her failure to attune herself thoroughly and consistently enough to him. The realities of her own life and her way of working created the limits in their relationship. These limitations might be more than he could take. His life might not improve; and the heightened longings stimulated by the analysis might be so unbearable that he would kill himself.

Then, on several occasions, she conveyed to him that she knew he would feel acceptance and relief if she acknowledged the hopelessness and futility of their work: “It would even bring me real relief from the feeling that I am engaging you in something that benefits me while it perhaps endangers you and brings you (and me) more pain and little gain. But, at many moments, I feel a life within you, something that responds to me and stirs a feeling of life in me; and when I feel this, the hopelessness and futility is not the only thing in the picture. I can’t ignore that life, despite my own uncertainty about the ultimate outcome.”

These clearly painful realizations on her part were conveyed to him as she understood them. They seemed to make him feel that she was less deceptive with herself, and that was of some importance to him. Soon after this, the analyst saw an uncharacteristic flicker of a smile on his face at the beginning of an hour, a smile that he quickly aborted. When she asked about it, he said, “I come in the door and look in your eyes and see you smile and it’s like I’m inside it, inside the smile. If I don’t ‘stay in your smile’ I’ll have nothing to say. If I stay in it and smile back, I’ll begin to lose myself in you. But if I don’t see you smile I’m completely alone and lost.”

Through all these episodes, the analyst came to appreciate further that, beyond the frustrations produced by her maintaining professional and personal limits, it was, in many ways, her life itself—her feelings, hope, needs—that was dangerous to him. He desperately needed to
feel her life, but, simultaneously, it threatened to rob him of himself, to kill him. Ultimately, it seemed to be her continuing, inevitable self-deceptions (that is, her unwitting tendency to confuse their interests) that drove him into a quietly raging despair. And it was her open revelation to him, each time, of her dawning realizations about her need to remain hopeful (for herself as well as for him) that restored the sense of realness and authenticity to their relationship.

Near the seventh year of treatment, Edward commented that he thought she had begun to move her hands a lot more. Only when he said this did she become aware that she had, in fact, been dimly aware of feeling this shift herself.

"Is it true?" he asked.
"Yes. As you say it, I can see it."
"What does it mean?" Edward asked.

She said she feels as if she were groping toward him and groping around herself, searching in the dark. She had, she told him, begun to try to express things with him that she didn't really understand but was trying anyway.

Soon he began to question her frequently whenever he felt that she might be holding back. He said he wished she could "push him more."
"Do you even know what to do to push me anyway?"
"I feel as if I'm pushing you when I respond in some way that you'll feel is for me, not for you. You know, based on my belief in analysis, my agenda."

Surprisingly, he now seemed genuinely unconcerned about this major issue.

"Look," the analyst said. "It often feels as if there is one kind of pushing that feels as if it is for you but that I realize is for me. And another kind that feels as if I'm taking some kind of risk for myself."
"You? What do you mean, risk?"

Moving her hands helped a lot here. Edward averted his eyes, as though he could not stand to see her make a false step.

"Sometimes," she said, "I start to worry that we're doing things here that are really my agenda—that it is going too far for you. It can feel essentially cruel, that it will hurt you, make you 'regress,' less able to work and function. The risk for me often comes when I say to myself, 'Don't let this fear control you. You know you believe more and more that what you're trying to do is basically right. Be more active with him, go ahead, put it in words, try whatever it is out.' I think it's when I take this risk of hurting you that something feels like a good kind of pushing."
Edward's face opened gradually as she spoke. He nodded. Something was clearly getting through, but it often did. After a pause, he burst out, "So all these years I've been thinking you're sitting there thinking about me—and you're actually thinking about you!"

They both laughed very hard.

"This is such a strange relationship," he said. "We're here to understand me, but we have to understand you in order to understand me."

Slowly, over much time, through this kind of negotiated understanding, Edward began to develop a sense of realness in the relationship with his analyst that, for the first time, seemed to endure despite the annihilating pull of the "black hole." He reported that he felt somehow that something more solid had come into his experience and that he thought he had perhaps chosen to live.

The relationship between Edward and his analyst was fraught with deepening experiences of conflict and the continuing uncovering of a web of unwitting deceptions and self-deceptions. No doubt Edward's pathology—the tenuousness of his self-organization and his entrenched, unrelenting beliefs in the danger and hopelessness of relationships—contributed heavily to the extreme complexity of negotiating a greater closeness with him. Equally, aspects of his analyst's struggle derived from rigidities and blind spots within her self-organization. Yet we believe a very significant dimension of this conflict, deception, and self-deception was not attributable to his pathology or to idiosyncratic countertransference obstacles or to significant technical failures on the part of his analyst.

In the course of the negotiation process, Edward and his analyst challenged each other's identity on many different levels. His primitive transference (in both its pathological and adaptive elements) served to create and sustain a relentless series of challenges to his analyst's identity. But these challenges were—had to be—quite real to her; they entailed a deep and consistent questioning, and revising, of the

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5Pizer (1992, 1996) has developed an interesting perspective in which negotiation and "mutual adjustment" are central to the analytic process. His emphasis is on the process of negotiation of many of the paradoxical aspects of the patient–analyst experience. Although a full discussion of his concept is beyond the scope of this paper, we believe that the "negotiation of paradox" invariably takes place within the context of the negotiation of conflicts interest and may represent a clinical emphasis that is potentially complementary to our own.
way she organized aspects of her personal world. Yet only in the course of her sustained negotiation with Edward did these features of her identity take on meaning as “countertransference obstacles” that needed to be overcome. In other words, aspects of her personal and analytic identity needed to be reopened in order to negotiate an authentic relationship with Edward, not because they were especially problematic in her own personal or professional life.

At the same time, the challenge and negotiation were not simply an “enactment,” a replay of pathological relational scenarios induced or recruited (by projective identification) into the mind of the analyst. The negotiation was over real conflicts between Edward’s identity and the analyst’s personal and professional identity, conflicts that were clearly intensified by the tremendous natural seduction (Friedman, 1991) and potential for deception in the analytic situation. Yet this conflict served as an indispensable vehicle for creating a meaningful negotiation process.

**Implications**

In the first section of this article, we presented a view of internal and intersubjective conflict as fundamentally rooted in a *normal, adaptive bias that pervades our subjectivity*—a bias that will inevitably clash with the subjectivities of others. The existence of such “evolved, existential conflict” is an ancient, enduring aspect of human development and adult life. It accounts for the existence of a concomitant, evolved tendency to disguise (from others and ourselves) aspects of our subjective bias while anticipating and evaluating the motivated biases in the subjectivities of others. We are, in effect, designed to open ourselves (but only partially and selectively) to the influence—the enormous shaping power—of an engagement with the relational world.

We talked about conflict, deception, and self-deception from a vantage point that lies a bit outside of the customary language and frameworks of tranference–countertransference, enactment, affective resonance, projective identification, and so on, in which contemporary analysts customarily discuss the complex intersections of the subjective worlds of analyst and patient. From this broader perspective we raised very fundamental questions about the therapeutic relationship as a human endeavor. These questions are touched on in much contemporary relational and intersubjective writing, yet, the language of our
usual clinical-theoretical narratives keeps us from getting at this broader relational reality.

Now the question is, how do we relate what we have been describing in somewhat new language to more familiar analytic concepts and ways of talking about some of these same clinical phenomena?

Our view of conflict and deception—self-deception takes us far from what we believe is the classical analytic emphasis on conflict emanating from (ultimately drive-based) motivated distortions of reality. Yet we move well beyond the tendency of relational, intersubjective models to attribute conflict exclusively to the unfortunate vicissitudes of an individual’s particular, problematic (or less than adequate) relational experience. Our perspective allows us to bring into focus a very important arena of inevitable, motivated conflict and deception within all relationships, including the treatment relationship. We focus on an aspect of conflict that is a function of both the therapist’s and the patient’s biased subjectivity. And while always intertwined with meanings derived from past experience (transference) and countertransference, a crucial element in this very real, ongoing conflict and deception is lost when it is reduced to either a) a “role-responsive” (Sandler, 1997) enactment of the patient’s old pathogenic reality (through the necessary enlistment of inevitable countertransference); or b) the complexity and difficulty of the therapist’s dealing with his or her own selfobject needs (Bacal and Thomson, 1996; Stolorow and Atwood, 1992) in the effort to sustain a sufficiently other-oriented, empathic stance. Let us look at some of the implications of viewing the familiar, analytic notions of projective identification, enactment, empathy, and authenticity from the point of view of the universal mixture of conflict, deception, and self-deception that we call evolved existential conflict.

**Projective Identification and Enactments**

In speaking of relational dynamics in which conflict is induced within the other, people often use the term projective identification. For us, this term is problematic when it refers to a process by which certain versions of self-experience, or of inner conflict, are somehow seen as “put into” the therapist or even simply as eliciting an affective resonance in the therapist’s personal life. Such “induced” experience and role responsiveness (Sandler, 1976; Ogden, 1985) may well occur but do not capture the interactive and internal negotiation process to
which we are referring. The related notion of enactment can be talked about in the same way: as though the transference–countertransference mix that is enacted (and, it is to be hoped, eventually understood) were a kind of as-if scenario in which the participants emotionally relive the patient's fantasy world—not the therapist's real (and fantasy) world—as it is activated by their relationship (Bollas, 1987; Jacobs, 1991).

We are referring to a more interactive process that is closer to those processes described in discussions about the patient's evocation of—and attunement to—the real inner life of the therapist (Searles, 1975; Hoffman, 1983, 1991; Aron, 1991; Blechner, 1992; Lichtenberg, Lachmann, and Fosshage, 1992; Pizer, 1992, 1996; Davies, 1994; Rogers, 1995). We are proposing that such interactive processes can be understood as operating within a broader “evolutionary biological” understanding of the inevitability of conflict in all human relationships. The experience of negotiation in the treatment relationship is activated by an adaptive striving by patient and analyst to engage real conflicts—real multiplicity and inner dividedness—within the therapist in the treatment relationship.

The evocation of conflict within the analyst and the recognition of the clash between the analyst's identity and that of the patient serves to create the necessary conditions for a genuine renegotiation of internal representations (beliefs, introjects, expected interactional patterns) that were forged in the context of mutuality, conflict, and deception within earlier formative relationships. Patients are highly attuned to the therapist's ways of dealing with the inevitable conflicts of interest experienced within his or her identity and between his or her identity and that of the patient. We believe that we are all equipped with an evolved, intuitive sensitivity to the natural self-deceptions and deceptions in which we all engage and (especially in the clinical setting) must tease out in ourselves and each other. Let us consider how this natural, adaptive sensitivity relates to the use of empathy as an analytic stance.

The Intrinsic Ambiguities of Empathy

Edward's analyst made a skillful effort to grasp consistently his experience—to maintain a consistently empathic stance (Ornstein, 1979; Kohut, 1984) or a "sustained empathic inquiry," as the intersubjectivists put it (Stolorow et al., 1987). This stance was crucial to keeping the conflict within tolerable limits for both of them by
minimizing Edward's experience of the divergence of their subjective worlds. But, contrary to the impression given in much of the self-psychological literature, on many occasions the empathic grasp of Edward's experience, though crucial, was of limited effectiveness. We think the reason for this is that a consistent attunement to Edward's subjective world did not, in itself, go far enough as a genuine signal of the analyst's capacity to ally with Edward's interests. And at moments it even exacerbated his sense that she was deceptively evading the conflict that he knew existed between them.

If we understand the meaning of empathy in the context of the background of expectable conflict and deception in the therapeutic relationship (that is, beyond the self-psychological/intersubjective frameworks in which it is often embedded), we can see why an empathic stance is a vital, effective communication of the analyst's position regarding the patient's real interests. Yet, at the same time, we can see how the very sources of empathy's effectiveness as an interpersonal communication generate problems that necessitate other ways of relating.

Empathy is a fundamental interpersonal signal that lets patients know that a genuine alliance with their interests is a real possibility. Sustained empathic communication signals that the therapist is more likely than most perhaps to be willing to decenter from his or her own personally adaptive bias (and to be emotionally capable of doing so) in order to join in viewing things from the subjective point of view of the patient. The therapist's consistent decentering, or abandoning of his or her own (personally more adaptive) subjective view, even though only temporary and never fully achieved, signals the potential for a genuine investment that might be emotionally equated with the type of investment experienced outside of the analytic setting only with a true friend or close relative.

Yet no therapist can achieve a consistently empathic immersion in another's experience. Essentially the design of our psyche—the nature of human relating—mitigates against it. Even a largely consistent empathic stance is very hard to achieve.

In a discussion of the highly disciplined, consistently empathic inquiry written about and practiced by the analyst, Evelyne Schwaber, Lawrence Friedman (1992) noted that in Dr. Schwaber's persistent struggle to share her patient's point of view, she shows us something that we might not see as clearly in Kohut: it is not just empathy that is powerful, but the wish and effort to
empathize. Dr. Schwaber puts the spotlight on what is in the shadow of Kohut's theory: the negative aspect of empathizing is as important as the positive; the empathizer's willingness to give up his own investment. . . . The analyst is frustrating her own natural thinking style in order to . . . come close to the patient. Recognizing the magnitude of the sacrifice, the patient can probably feel the analyst's urge toward closeness almost physically. Ordinarily, only an unusually dedicated love would produce such a self-sacrificing devotion. . . . Most analysts want to know their patients well. But they are not all equally willing to discomfort themselves in the process, and not all theories encourage such discomfort.

We think Friedman has accurately captured some of the enormous meaning communicated within the struggle (see Schwaber, 1983) to maintain an empathic stance. We also suggest that Kohut and the self psychologists have, as Friedman notes, left the meaning of this struggle in the shadows. There has been a tendency in self psychology to discuss the empathic stance in ways that imply that it is largely a technical maneuver.

Attributing failures of empathy to individual countertransference or faulty technique (and successes to proper techniques and a lack of countertransference interference) can be very misleading; it is only one version of the story, a limited version that leaves out the fact that we experience consistently empathic responsiveness as a (usually very welcome) deviation from what is normative in virtually all human relationships—not simply from those relationships that have significantly failed us. Every child is prepared (from the moment of conception onward) to expect that the relational world will be filled with hard-to-recognize conflict, conflict that is likely to be hidden behind rules and views that are represented as more tailored to the child's own interests than in fact they are.

A consistently empathic stance is, in this sense, simply unnatural. A highly consistent attempt to communicate to the patient exclusively from a vantage point within the patient's subjective world (although absolutely crucial) will tend to be only cautiously accepted by some patients and, for others, will become suspect as a strategy for hiding the therapist's self. Some therapists may, in fact, use the empathic stance to remain defensively hidden from their patients. Over and above any particular individual defensiveness that may be attributed
to the therapist, the overly consistent use of the empathic mode will, for some patients, be sensed as the therapist's hiding some aspect of himself or herself, possibly in the pursuit of his or her own interests. Often, an immersion in the patient's subjective world must be complemented by what is, in effect, the visible expression of the therapist's reality (Ehrenberg, 1992; Fosshage, 1995).

As Modell (1991) notes, there is an enduring set of paradoxes here: the therapist cares and listens deeply, and yet, when the hour ends, the therapist summarily dismisses the patient. The patient must believe in the reality of the powerful feelings that arise in the relationship and yet tolerate that, at the very same time, to a degree, there are limits and boundaries on the expression of these feelings that would be inconceivable in a naturally occurring relationship. A patient once referred to this as an ongoing sense that one lives with a "taboo" in therapy, a certain taboo of the real. Many aspects of a real relationship are there but never fully touchable. Like all taboos, the forbidden fruit of the real heightens the power of the situation and also makes the situation quite precarious. For some patients, this particular heightened longing is unbearable. For most patients (and therapists) there are times when it is it is barely bearable. It is always a background tension.


There are inevitably times when, as Hoffman (1994) says, the therapist must "throw away the book" in order to demonstrate a genuine willingness to place the patient before some of the rules of therapy. Patients can feel the therapist's move away from a loyalty to teachers, belief systems, the hiding places afforded by rules and rituals. There is a palpable satisfaction—perhaps a corrective emotional experience—in the sense of "spontaneous deviation . . . shared by patient and therapist . . . when they depart from an internalized convention of some kind." The "taboo of the real" is broken, and the validity of the therapeutic relationship is affirmed when the therapist's struggle to engage with a particular patient calls into question some of the rituals, rules, and beliefs important to the therapist (in this case encoded in a whole style and tone of relating). It becomes a more real relationship as the "one size fits all" structures, rules, and expectations set in place before the two parties even met are renegotiated in the specific relationship between two individuals.
Throwing away the book, however, can and has, in some circles, "become the book" (Hoffman, 1994)! A certain idealization of therapeutic spontaneity or self-disclosure tends to emerge in which this behavior itself becomes a new agenda, an agenda that, as we see it, *will inevitably become biased toward the needs and views of those who come to advocate it*. As any new therapeutic approach (any new stance and version of technique, regardless of its content) emerges, it will often represent, in part, a movement away from the therapist's traditional preconceptions and loyalties toward the patient's subjective reality. Then, as the new approach becomes codified, it will tend to become more and more invested with the therapist's own personal identity and agenda as well as the collective agenda of the members of a new faction or school.

With a bit more historical perspective than analysts are accustomed to adopting, we can see how virtually any codified analytic approach will almost certainly come to yield a new set of rituals. In other words, the reason that "throwing out the book becomes the book" lies precisely in the ongoing, natural tendency of therapists to *bias* the process toward their own ends. Hoffman seems to be addressing some of the problems introduced by this tendency toward bias when he recommends the maintenance of a "dialectic" between the therapist's acceptance of ritual authority and anonymity, on one hand, and "spontaneous deviation" (including self-revelations) from those rituals on the other. Out of this dialectical tension and acknowledgment of the paradoxical realness and unrealness of the analytic situation a more genuine "authenticity" in the therapist's participation is expected to emerge.

We believe that, if we appreciate Hoffman's paradoxical dialectic, we are likely to practice with a new sensibility rather than a new set of rules and technical guidelines. Such a sensibility represents a higher level principle concerning the necessary struggle with (deviation from) authority with which each therapeutic relationship compels us to engage. Thus, Hoffman's views probably encourage the sort of grappling with inner and interpersonal conflict that enhances the therapist's authenticity. Though such a higher principle is less likely to become codified and ritualized into a "new book," we suspect that, over time, even such a broad dialectical principle is not likely to transcend the deeply rooted tendency (in the therapist, his culture, his therapeutic "school") to translate and ritualize the meaning of the principle in ways that are biased toward his own subjective ends. Thus, ultimately, we would expect that this very dialectical principle would come to be...
concretized and practiced in a way that, itself, would need to be "deviated from" and negotiated.

The natural and universal tendency to bias technique (often self-deceptively) toward the analyst's interests is an important aspect of why consistent attempts to apply many specific analytic, technical prescriptions are of limited value (see Greenberg, 1995). Any stance or set of techniques that is formulated prior to the engagement of specific individuals in a particular psychoanalytic relationship—be it neutrality, sustained empathic inquiry, relational authenticity (or even a broad appreciation of the dialectic between ritual authority and spontaneity)—may tend to become deceptive, a deception that is usually rooted in self-deception. In this sense, "authenticity" in our responses as analysts is a quality that can only gradually be achieved, or created, through our struggle with our patients' influence on us: the struggle to reopen aspects of our own identity (including our therapeutic frame), with minimal deception and self-deception, in areas that are elicited by and relate to our patients' conflicts.

Sometimes the changes, the needed deviations, are "spontaneous," as Hoffman (1992) put it, only after the therapists' prolonged immersions in their own subjective world as it is influenced by their struggle to relate intimately with their patients. Consider Ogden's (1994) description of the coming to life of an analysis that had seemed correct but lifeless:

In retrospect, my analytic work with Mrs B to this point had sometimes felt to me to involve an excessively dutiful identification with my own analyst (the 'old man'). I had not only used phrases that he had regularly used, but also at times spoke with an intonation that I associated with him. . . . My experience in the analytic work . . . had "compelled me" to experience the unconscious fantasy that the full realization of myself as an analyst could occur only at the cost of the death of another part of myself (the death of an internal object analyst/father) [p. 16].

At the outset of an analysis, the analyst may start out as a "new object," a person whom the patient can experience as having views, needs, and responsiveness different from the patient's familial objects (Greenberg, 1986). We also know, however, that usually the analyst simultaneously starts out as an "old object"; both patient and analyst will, from the outset, reenact old relational patterns. Only through a
prolonged interpersonal and internal negotiation with the challenge and influence of the patient can the analyst, cumulatively, become for the patient a more fully usable “new object,” new to the patient because the analyst is—through the negotiation process—new to him- or herself!

From this point of view, it is the experience of the process of negotiating the real conflicts between the analyst's and patient's “otherness”—their differing needs and identities—that constitutes “what is new.” It is the patient's experience of the analyst's changing—of the analyst struggling to come to terms with something new—that provides the crucial knowledge that there is a genuine working negotiation occurring. Because the relationship between analyst and patient entails real conflicts between their identities, the negotiation process, ultimately involving real changes in the analyst, provides the crucial experience for the patient to reopen and rework old conclusions about his or her self and the potential for effective negotiations with the relational world.

Some Concluding Thoughts

As our patients try to raise questions about their own entrenched, debilitating ways of experiencing themselves, they use the transference to ferret out and activate within the current therapeutic relationship precisely those areas of relational conflict and (failed) interpersonal negotiation in which old conclusions about themselves were formed. The transference may begin by creating an “as-if” reality, if you will, a “potential space” for activating and exploring the past in the present. But, although this reliving of the patient's transference is crucial, it cannot be an end in itself. Such analytic “play” leads, in turn, to a call for the opening up of real, often unseen but inevitable, conflicts within the analyst and the conflicting needs of analyst and patient. In this sense, transference is a vehicle, a means to arrive at an arena in which the therapist's own identity, own real strivings and interests, become deeply engaged in the negotiation process. Transference (or projective identification) brings the analyst into a realm in which the past is not simply enacted (or affectively resonated with by the analyst) in the present. The past is, in fact, rediscovered by the patient in the present in a very profound way—in the analyst’s identity and the realities of being with the analyst. As Edward put it, after years of intensely
confusing negotiation, “This is such a strange relationship . . . We’re here to understand me, but we have to understand you in order to understand me.” Here is where the process of interpersonal, intersubjective negotiation becomes most difficult—and most genuine.

From the word go, the therapeutic relationship is filled with many moments—from mini-“crunches” (Russell, 1973) like those illustrated in the cases of Nancy and Tanya to vast, conflictual landscapes like that described between Edward and his analyst. This is the arena in which patients look for and enable us to see some of the divisions and tensions in our identity, the multiplicity and bias in us. Wittingly and unwittingly, we let them raise questions about who we are. Through such adaptive probing, patients may palpably sense how they can influence us (“deconstruct” us). They can sense how, when faced with this challenge, we put ourselves back together (in a somewhat different way) in the context of our particular relationship with them.

A genuine renegotiation, reintegration (an increased experience of “realness”) is far more likely to occur when our patients see what happens when—tapping into the fault lines in our identity, our conflicts—they take us someplace that is obviously hard for us to go. But we go there and often change in the process, because having a relationship with them requires it. They are worth it. All the time, our patients provoke in us (and read) the quality of our inner dialectic, our ways of experiencing and resolving internal and interpersonal conflict. And they assess its implications for renegotiating or reintegrating their selves in the context of inducing us to adapt to them—and them to us.

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